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Introduction
The Spanish Civil War was essentially the prelude to World War Two and has been
subject to many analyses about the course of events and its impact. These analyses mostly focus
on aspects of the battles, the social changes that occurred in places such as Catalonia, and the
ways various world powers were involved. Most of the talk about the Spanish Civil War is
Eurocentric, which makes sense because it occurred in Spain and European powers were
involved in the fighting. However, what is often forgotten is that Spain was at the time a colonial
power with holdings in Northern Morocco and Equatorial Guinea. There is little discussion on
the impact that these colonies had on the war nor on how colonized people were involved. This is
despite the fact that the main revolt that started the war did not occur in Spain but in a Moroccan
Colony and that Francisco Franco, the main general on the Nationalist side and future dictator of
Spain, began his career fighting in Morocco.
Morocco’s significance to the Spanish Civil War has been hidden largely due to a lack of
historical context of the war along with the racism that permeated from it. When the war is
discussed, it can sometimes be mistaken as a conflict that only involved Spanish soldiers. In
reality, the combatants were people from all across the world, including but not limited to Cuba,
Russia, America, and most relevant to this article, Morocco. The Spanish Republic is framed as a
progressive democracy and as Socialist by historians, yet what is forgotten is that the Spanish
Republic retained colonies in Africa until 1936. While the Nationalist forces were far more antidemocratic and authoritarian, the exclusion of the Republic’s colonial aspirations creates an
incomplete history that obscures vital aspects of the war. What is found by studying Morocco is
the very foundations of the Civil War, both in terms of the people who fought and its origins.
Spanish and Moroccan history have been connected since the very foundation of the
modern Spanish state. The Umayyad caliphate invaded Iberia in 711 and introduced a direct
connection between North Africa and the Peninsula. For the next seven hundred years, the
Muslim kingdoms of Spain would be the center of a multi-religious and cultural fusion that
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marks Spain to this day. However, by the 14th Century, the northern Catholic Kingdoms of
Aragon and Nevarre would begin the Reconquista, the reconquering of Spain in the name of
Catholicism. By 1469, the peninsula was unified into two Christian monarchies comprising
Portugal and Spain.1
The early seeds of beliefs that would later comprise both Colonialism and Fascism were
planted in this event. The end of the war brought with it a purge of any non-Catholic religious
beliefs in the peninsula. The Catholic Monarchy and Church established the Inquisition whose
goal was to convert or kill any Muslim, Jewish, or secular elements still remaining on the
continent. Religion was believed by the Spanish church as transferable by blood and this belief
developed into the racialization of non-Catholic people as non-white which helped to develop a
white Spanish hierarchy.2 This idea would influence Spanish society for some time and would
later be imported to the Americas in the form of the Racial Casta system. This is not surprising,
considering that the Reconquista was still ongoing in 1492 when colonization of the Americas
began. However, the Spanish belief of racial superiority would largely be fueled by their
perception of “The Moor.” Mauraphobia and Mauraphillia were spawned from the conquest and
would seek to other the Moor by combining Christian imagery with the killing of non-believers.
The image of “The Moor'' was depicted through Moros y Cristianos, local events that celebrate
the conquest and Catholicization of Spain while denigrating the Moors. Another Maurophobic
image is that of Saint James Matamoros the Moor Killer.3 Both of these symbols would serve as
a way to other their enemies by depicting them as the non-white and non-Christian other
wherever Spain colonized.
Spanish Fascism would be born largely in the colonization of Morocco. Fascism has been
argued as Colonialism brought home4 and the creation of the Nationalist movement in Spain
lends support to this claim. The means and tactics by which the Civil War was fought can be
traced to Morocco and despite being a Spanish War, the Nationalist forces were made up of large
numbers of Moroccan recruits. This alone can attest to the importance of understanding
Morocco, but its vital role goes beyond this as the foundations of the war and its outcome were
decided by whichever power had Morocco on its side. Morocco’s forces and strategic value
created the most advantageous position for Franco and the Nationalist forces which prolonged
the war to its eventual conclusion. Had Morocco not been a supply zone of well-trained troops,
the Nationalist forces on the Peninsula would have been evenly matched with Republican forces.
Morocco, with its interconnected history, created the foundation for Fascism and the
inclusion of Moroccans in Nationalist forces contributed to the end of Republican Spain.
Furthermore, the complete failure of Republican Spain to ferment an independence revolt in
Morocco was not only an example of the colonialist views of the Leftists forces in Spain, but a
vital reason for the Republic's ultimate defeat.
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Colonialism as Fascism’s Birthplace
Spain began to colonize Morocco in 1909. This point in time is significant as the Spanish
Empire had lost its Latin American colonies. In the mind of the Spanish Monarchy and
government, Morocco was a way to regain national prominence. The occupation of Morocco and
the Rif Wars of the 1920’s would be the fundamental place for the birth of Spanish Fascism. The
attitude of Spain towards Morocco was the same as the views of any other European colonizer,
framing Moroccans as backwards people that had to be civilized by Europeans. What is notable
about the Spanish colonization of Morocco is that the forces used to suppress the Moroccans
would come to be the same forces that would spread Fascism throughout Spain.
For example, the officers and generals who served in the colonialist ventures were
dubbed Africanistas. These officers were more politically conservative compared to the armies
on the peninsula and most of the generals favored or actively supported the monarchy in some
way. One motivating factor for this would be that King Alfonso XIII was the main supporter and
fancier of the colonization wars.5 This conservatism was also combined with their glorification of
colonialism, as many Africanistas also looked back on the war with fond memories. They saw
themselves as crusaders coming to civilize the land with a “parental like” attitude towards the
Moroccans.6 This paternalism is notable because it developed into the most brutal and
authoritarian rule over the Moroccans. The generals developed the use of death squads in their
tactics that would be used to suppress the Republican forces in the Civil War. Another
development of the Rif Wars was the creation of one of the most important armies of the Spanish
Civil War: the Army of Africa. This army was created in order to repress all the attempts by the
Rif and Berber Tribes from uniting and fighting off the Spanish. It comprised two different
sections, most notably the Regulares section that was made up of Moroccan recruits.7 They were
used as a suppressive force to put down any resistance in the Moroccan colony. However, the
training they received in Morocco would be later used in the Civil War, such as with the use of
colonial death squads.
Another important thing to note is that the creation of these two military groups would set
the foundations for many of the future Nationalist officers. A large number of the Africanistas
would later go on to be the generals and soldiers behind the Nationalist uprising. The most
notable of these was Francisco Franco who began his career serving in the Rif War and became
the youngest officer to be promoted to general. His development was heavily connected to the
Rif Wars as he states “without Africa I can scarcely explain myself to myself, nor can I explain
myself properly to my comrades in arms.”8 He and many other Africanistas' colonialist obsession
with Morocco was so great that, in 1924 they plotted a coup against the Spanish dictator Primo
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de Rivera when he made motions indicating he wished to pull the army out.9 Indeed, to many of
these generals, Morocco was a second home, and increasingly so after the establishment of the
Second Spanish Republic in 1931. The Spanish Republic had introduced numerous reforms that
upset the army and the colonial officers. They had been upset by the cut in funding to the army,
the changes in the military command, and, most importantly, the introduction of liberal reforms
that occurred.
Not only were most of these officers conservative but they were also devout Catholics.
This is important because the Second Republic had greatly angered the church by introducing
liberal policies such as divorce and the removal of any special church powers in the 1930s.10
Many high-ranking Catholic officials of Spain directly declared the Republic illegitimate11 and
attempted to mobilize tensions and fears that the Republic was devolving into Communism and
Atheism. Priests leading congregations, the Catholic newspaper, and connected organizations
were also generating the fear and hatred that would make a Fascist coup “feasible.”12 If the
progressive reforms of society did not horrify conservative generals into adopting Fascist ideals
on their own, the Catholic church would actively pressure them into further supporting them.
Many would begin to see Spain as another Morocco, a place that had to be civilized from
“Rebellious tribes.”13 The Africanistas would look at Spain with the same paternalism intent on
bringing “civilization” to the godless. The Nationalists actively described their revolt as a
crusade or something akin to a modern Reconquista.14 Francisco Franco even described the
revolt as a “Limpieza'', or cleaning up of, everything foreign in Spain. In this case, that meant
Socialism, Democracy, and anything non-Catholic.15
The Spanish form of Fascism was directly created and developed by the colonial wars of
Morocco. The ideas and beliefs of many of the nationalist generals first formed with the
colonization of Morocco. Even if the Africanista generals were not specifically Fascist, they
would have been monarchists or devout Catholics and would have joined their respective
factions, such as the Carlists or the Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights (CEDA), that
would join the Nationalist side of the war. The generals that were fascist would also go on to join
the Falange Espanola de las JONS, the largest Fascist organization of the Nationalists. The JONS
part is the name of the organization: Juntas de Ofensive Nacional Sindicalista whose founding
document expressed the goal of creating a new Spanish Empire that would encompass French
Morocco as well as French Algeria.16 Fascist aspirations in Spain were either born in the
Colonial war or revolved around colonialism in some way. Many of the generals would describe
the reasons for starting the uprising using the exact same rhetoric of a colonialist war except this
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time directed at the people in Spain. It is not simply that the Generals of the Nationalists served
in Morocco. It is that their experiences and views in Morocco served as an incubation for the
later Fascist revolt which demonstrates the important foundational role that Morocco had in the
Spanish Civil War.
The Importance of Moroccans during the Civil War
Not only was Morocco key in the foundations for the Civil War, but it was also key to the
Nationalist victory. While the Republican forces of the war were generally ill equipped compared
to the Nationalists, at the start, they were generally matched when it came to the army size and in
some cases the Republican forces were much larger than the Nationalist forces. However, the
first revolt of the war was in Morocco, and in securing the colony for the Nationalist side, the
Fascists not only secured a base for the invasion of the peninsula, but they also secured the welltrained Army of Africa that would prove to be decisive in the outcome of the war.
A significant number of Moroccans would make up the Nationalist side; over 80,000
troops alone were part of the Army of Africa.17 The Moroccan soldiers recruited into this army
served as shock troops for most battles in the Civil War and were an efficient fighting force.
These troops had a number of reasons for supporting the Nationalist side ranging from
ideological to economic. Many Moroccans joined because, although Franco was ardently
Catholic, he made attempts to accommodate the Islamic beliefs of his troops. He professed the
idea of “Hispanic Moroccan Brotherhood” and helped to organize religious practices as well as
trips to Mecca for Moroccan religious leaders.18 There is also the fact that the Spanish Left was
viewed as radically atheist by some religious Moroccans who felt that Franco and the
Nationalists were the only ones fighting off the anti-religious tide of Spain. However, the two
main reasons for Moroccan support were for anti-colonial and economic reasons. The
Nationalists had promised not just autonomy to Moroccan leaders but independence for their
service.19 This swayed a good amount of support and recruitment to the Nationalist side and will
be touched upon in more detail when discussing the failure of the Spanish Republic. Another
huge factor was simple economic reasons as joining the Nationalist army and the pre-war army
paid better. Many flocked to the war or were paid as mercenaries because the current conditions
of Morocco were extremely poor.20 The conditions of the Spanish colony were underdeveloped
and dependent on Spain creating mass poverty for a majority of Moroccan families. These
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conditions were compounded by recent crop failure in the 1920s which created more poverty and
made Northern Morocco even more reliant on Spain. This pushed Moroccans to join the Army of
Africa to find a decent income. When the Fascist revolt began, these Moroccans then found
themselves serving the Nationalist side.
This heavy recruitment of Moroccans before the war had a decisive effect on the outcome
of the conflict. The Moroccan troops greatly tipped the balance of the war in the favor of the
Nationalists providing them with more numerous and experienced troops. As mentioned before,
Moroccans were used as shock troops when attacking the enemies and, aside from the physical
damage they caused, they were also used for psychological terror. The Nationalists used the very
existence of Moroccan troops as propaganda, conjuring up images of “The Moor” to insight
terror and fear in the Republican populace.21 This tactic was very effective and actually did
insight fear and outright desertion of Republican forces before battles. More importantly
however, Moroccans were present in almost every major battle in the war and served as extra
expendable troops for the Nationalists. Moroccan troops were given the deadliest assignments
and suffered the most casualties in the army because they were sent in before the rest of the
Nationalist forces.22 This tactic meant that while the Moroccans of the Army of Africa suffered
great losses, the Spanish and European forces could easily secure territory with minimal damage.
This let the Nationalists sacrifice as many lives as they wished to drain the Republican forces to
defeat.
Their importance was also seen by Nationalist leaders and they saw the Army of Africa
as their key to victory. The Fascist generals placed little faith in the troops on the peninsula and
focused heavily on securing the support of the Army of Africa before the revolt.23 The reason for
this is that, unlike the Africanistas, the Peninsulares in the mainland were more liberal in their
politics if not explicitly Socialist.24 Franco was the conservative General that seemed able to
convince the Army of Africa to revolt. It was for this reason that he was given so much
prominence by the Nationalist forces.25 This importance was also not lost on him as he saw the
Army of Africa as a way to help him secure power.26 From the perspective of most generals,
securing Morocco and the Army of Africa for their coup was the only hope for it being
successful. Morocco served as a stable base of operations and supplied a large surplus of troops
for the Nationalists. They were well trained and effective on the battlefield and the number of
soldiers could break the balance on the peninsula. Without Moroccans, the Republican side
would not have necessarily won the war, but it would have put the Nationalists at a disadvantage
and made it more difficult for them to defeat the Republican forces by 1939. This also shows
why the Nationalist revolt began in Morocco instead of on the peninsula. It wasn't just that the
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Nationalists had a secure base in Morocco, but that it was vitally important to their successful
war.
Failure of Republican and Revolutionary Policy
The people of Morocco, however, were not just important for understanding the
Nationalist victory. They were also important when understanding the Republican failure. Many
historians and observers of the war have noted how decisive an anti-Franco revolt would be for
the Republican side. They separately agree that if the Moroccans had revolted against the
Nationalists in Morocco, the Fascist forces would have been significantly weakened so as to give
the Republicans victory. This anti-Franco revolt never materialized however, and while the
Republican forces were being torn apart by infighting, the Nationalists never experienced a large
scale anti-nationalist movement in their territory. This is largely due to the Colonial policy and
views of the ostensibly Left “Revolutionary” government that discouraged any kind of anticolonial movement to form in Morocco. The actions of the Republican forces and their clinging
to colonialism made them lose all support from the Moroccan people which only helped to
further their destruction.
One of the first people to discuss the importance of a revolution in Morocco and the
main inspiration for this research was George Orwell. During the Spanish Civil War, he served in
the Trotskyist POUM militia stationed in Barcelona. He published an account of his experiences
titled Homage to Catalonia. Morocco is never mentioned in any great detail in the book,
typically being relegated to the description of the Nationalist forces he was fighting while
serving. This makes it all the more striking when he describes the failure of the Civil War and the
Republican Government. He lists a number of faults of the government and the failure of the
Spanish Revolution and then questions why the Republicans never attempted to foment a
revolution in Morocco. He states that by fomenting an uprising in Franco's rearguard, the
Nationalists would not have been able to maintain the front on the peninsula. Orwell says that all
the Popular Front had to do was to “declare Morocco liberated'' for this to happen. Instead, Spain
had attempted to placate British and French Colonialism.27 This small section from his
experiences in the war places great emphasis on the importance of the Moroccan people. He also
wrote about inciting a revolt in Morocco in 1937, a point at which the war was still not decided.
He also spoke about a revolt in Morocco as something that could easily end the war, showing
that he recognized its vital role in the conflict as he was serving. As argued in previous
paragraphs, the Moroccan troops were decisive for the Nationalists giving them a secure supply
of troops. If there was a revolt in Morocco it would not only threaten the base of Fascism,
ideologically it might lead Moroccan troops to desertion, mutiny, and to switch sides. It is
important to note that he doesn’t blame the Moroccans for not rising up against Franco but
instead blames the policy of the Popular Front Government. He directly criticized the Spanish
Government for placating European colonialism rather than pursuing a revolutionary policy. This
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highlights the real failure of the Republican government, that being the failure to adhere to any of
its revolutionary principles.
An Italian Anarchist involved in the Civil War, named Camillo Berneri also advocated
for a revolt in Morocco. Berneri went to Catalonia at the beginning of the revolution and was one
of the organizers for the Italian Volunteer column fighting on the Aragon Front. He argued that
because Franco's army relied heavily on a “Moorish Contingent”, granting independence to
Morocco would stir up Rebellion and demoralize the Nationalist forces.28 He also hoped that
Moroccans could be won to the side of the revolution and precipitate a revolution in North Africa
that would not only hurt Western Capitalism but also the Fascist government in Spain.29 For
Berneri the Spanish Revolution could win only on “revolutionary” terms, not on purely military
basis. A revolution in Morocco would ideologically disrupt the Nationalist forces in such a way
that mere battles could not. In this way, he also agrees with Orwell in the assertion that by
maintaining its colonial domination, the Republic greatly hurt its war effort.
The Republican government's attitude towards Morocco has a complicated and confusing
history that developed long before the Second Republic itself. During the 1920s, Spanish Leftists
were anti-colonial and condemned the invasion of Morocco. Anarchists in the CNT-FAI, the
largest Anarcho-Syndicalist labor union, staged numerous anti-war demonstrations and antirecruitment revolts in Catalonia that attempted to hurt the war effort in Morocco.30 However a
change in attitude began to emerge in 1934 during the Austrias Revolution. The Austrias
Revolution was an Anarchist and Communist led revolution that sought to establish Communism
in Spain and destroy the Second Republic. It was destroyed within a matter of weeks and was put
down by the Army of Africa under the command of Francisco Franco.31 Most of the army was
made up of Moroccans and a lot of the coverage in Republican newspapers was centered on the
image of a band of savage moors raping and massacring civilians.32 To the Spanish Working
class, Austrias would be a symbol of the “brutality” of Moroccan troops, in part developing a
racist belief amongst some of the Popular Front. As the Republican forces attempted to develop
propaganda against the largely Moroccan Nationalist forces, they developed racist depictions of
their enemy.
Although this attitude was not largely widespread as many on the Left were still very
anti-colonial, the onset of the war worsened this view. For both sides, the enemy was orientalized
as non-Spanish invading “Moors'', but the Republicans were different because they revived
Reconquista symbols.33 Republican forces resurrected the image of Saint James Matamoros
during the start of the war and also re-introduced the rallying cry “Moors a La Costa.”34 The
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rallying call was first used during the Reconquista and harkened back to the idea that the Moors
needed to be casted off entirely from the coast of Spain. The propaganda on the Republican side
also highlighted heavily the idea that their enemies were “Savage” by depicting the Army of
Africa as a band of “moors'' that were massacring and raping Spanish Women.35 Depictions and
propaganda such as this were so troubling and racist that many African Americans who served in
the International Brigades were appalled and uncomfortable with the Republican government. 36
This impart explains the colonialist attitude that the Republican government had towards
Morocco. A part of the Popular Front and soldiers did not see Moroccans as anything more than
the “Savage Moor'', a counter revolutionary enemy that had to be suppressed for serving
Fascism. Yet even this is not the full picture of the failure that was the Republic's colonial policy.
What truly doomed the Republic entirely was the clinging to European colonialism that had
created these views.
A revolt against Franco was not entirely unthinkable in Morocco and was actually more
likely regardless of the Republics policies. The Moroccans were not bound to Fascism and did
not need to be told to revolt by the Republicans as many people demonstrated their agency as
soon as the Civil War started. When the revolt first began, various cities in the north such as
Melilla revolted against the Nationalist uprising and managed to form militias that fended off the
Fascists for a few days.37 During the entire war, various Communist and independence groups
sabotaged the Fascists war efforts and helped to foment an anti-recruitment movement in
Morocco. Most of the people and many tribes in the Rif also hated Franco and supported the
Republic, convincing people not to serve in the war and holding anti-Franco demonstrations.38
His unpopularity was so strong that Franco himself feared a revolt would be imminent. He was
forced to stop recruiting from the Rif and most of Spanish Morocco and he began to recruit
mercenaries from the French colonies towards the end of the war.39 As mentioned before, the
reason that most Moroccans were held into service was for financial stability and the promise
that Morocco would either be given independence or more autonomy. This last reason, the
promise of independence was the exact same reason why there was never a full-scale revolt in
Morocco on the side of the Republic. The Spanish Republic never made any gestures towards
independence or greater autonomy for Morocco which greatly hurt Moroccan support. Despite
this, a number of Moroccans trying to gain independence directly approached the Republicans
for negotiation.
The first negotiation happened quite early on in the war. A Moroccan nationalist group
called the Moroccan Action Committee contacted French Communists in French Morocco and
got in touch with the Popular Front groups in Barcelona. David Rousset, a French Communist,
was one of the people present throughout the negotiations and saw it as his mission to convince
both the Moroccan Nationalists and Republicans to support a revolt in Morocco. He stated that “I
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realized that if there was a military uprising in the Spanish Rif, Franco would be caught in a cleft
stick and that, moreover, a very difficult situation would be created in the ranks of Franco’s
Moroccan troops.”40 He saw that Morocco was strategically important to the war effort in Spain
that it could both divert troops from the Spanish front lines as well as cause disruption amongst
the troops. Rousset helped to organize a meeting between Moroccan nationalists and members of
the CNT-FAI, a prominent leader in the Autonomous Catalan government.
Through negotiations with the Moroccan nationalists, the CNT-FAI and the POUM in
Catalonia discussed terms of independence. In the negotiations, the Moroccan leaders expressed
that they were ready to lead a military uprising against Franco in exchange for the recognition of
independence from the Spanish Republican Government.41 As Rousset points out however, the
treaty that was finally agreed upon by both the Moroccans and the CNT-FAI and POUM would
still maintain ties to the Spanish Government, limiting some of Morocco’s autonomy.42 He
described it as recognizing independence while still remaining close links to the metropolis and
the former colony. Despite this, it was supported by all groups including the Moroccan
representatives. It would later be fully supported by the Catalonia Generalitat, the government
representing the Catalonia autonomous region.
However, when the treaty of independence reached the larger Spanish Government in
Madrid, the negotiations broke down entirely. According to Rousset, the Moroccan committee
was met by Largo Caballero, the Prime Minister at the time, who promptly told them that the
government could not sign the treaty. Rousset also mentions that there was considerable pressure
on the Spanish Government from France and London who outright hated the treaty.43 This is
further corroborated in Spain: The Unfinished Revolution by Arthur Landis, who writes that
Largo Caballero, along with other government ministers, stated that they would vote down any
such proposal for fear of losing French and British support.44 This ended any real Moroccan
support for the Spanish. The prospect of a rebellion in Morocco was very possible and indeed
could have happened regardless of Republican intervention. Yet the negligence of the
Republican government doomed most of the hope for such a course in the war.
Spanish Eurocentrism and Colonialism
The Republican’s failure to ally with Moroccans was due to their failure to let go of
Eurocentrism. Even the Communists and Socialists of the government, groups of people who
expressed internationalism and anti-imperialism, still clung to racist and chauvinistic attitudes
when it came to the war. As mentioned before, Orwell declared that the government placated
French colonialism and Rousset asserted the exact same thing. However, there are also more
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direct assertions from the French Prime minister at the time, Leon Blum himself. Blum was a
Socialist Prime Minister, elected on a largely Socialist Popular Front government in 1937.
Despite this he feared that any sort of independence or autonomy in Morocco would threaten
French power in the region and in Africa. He pressured the Spanish Government against any
such negotiations, threatening to stop the already small amount of support France and Britain
were giving the Spanish Republic.45 He later cited this as his greatest political failure.46 Despite
the British and French, Spain still could have negotiated with Morocco either way and incited a
revolt. What stopped this from happening was the Republic's obsession with French and English
support in the war. A large reason that the Caballero government placated France was because
they saw France as the only way to win the war through either intervention or military aid. This
belief was a great detriment to the Republicans' cause. France and England were the main
proponents behind a non-intervention policy in Spain stopping any war support or military
intervention on either side of the war.47
England itself was very against any support early on, threatening to break all military ties
with France if France attempted to help the Socialists in Spain.48 This ruined the Republican war
effort severely as it allowed the Fascist side to be aided by Italian and German support while the
Republicans were left with nothing. In some cases, England also concretely supported the
Nationalist side in the war. The Spanish Navy had largely remained loyal to the Spanish
Republic, but because of British interference from Gibraltar, the Spanish Navy was unable to
blockade the introduction of Moroccan Troops to the peninsula.49 In other instances according to
“German sources” at the time, England was supplying munitions to France from Gibraltar on the
onset of the war.50 From this, English support for the Spanish democracy was not just unreliable
it was virtually impossible. The only explanation behind England’s hidden support for Fascism
was that it feared the spread of radical Communism in Europe. The Spanish Left had begun to
implement radical social change throughout the country such as collectivizing factories and
farms as well as expropriating wealth from Capitalists. This frightened England and its
conservative Tory government at the time, pushing it to pull all support for the Republic.
This becomes clearer with the strange involvement of the USSR. The Soviet Union had
given aid to Spain, yet the war support received was extremely small in comparison to the war
support given by Italy and Germany.51 Stalin also wrote directly to Largo Caballero advising him
not to hurt or collectivize any “French Bourgeoisie” property or wealth in the country.52 This
coupled with the Communist Party of Spain’s suppression of more radical elements in the
government showed that the USSR was more worried about how the conflict in Spain would be
perceived rather than who would win it. Indeed, Stalin was more worried about the formation of
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Fascist and Liberal alliances in Europe than he was about who would win in Spain. He feared
that a more Communist victory in Spain would frighten France and England in an alliance
against the Soviet Union.53 Stalin also feared that if the Spanish government fell too quickly,
Fascism would be strongly entrenched in Europe. This is the reason why the Soviet Union gave
aid to the Republic and signaled that it would be its fervent supporter in stopping Fascism despite
not giving substantial aid to the Republic. As such, not only was the Spanish Republic against the
Nationalists aided by Italy and Germany, but even its own supporters in Europe, England,
France, and the Soviet Union had different political aspirations in Spain and maneuvered in such
a way that led to the destruction of the Spanish Republic.
Despite this lack of support and political maneuvering, the Republic still remained loyal
to England, France, and the Soviet Union. They saw the European powers as the only nations
that could save them from Franco and the Nationalists. Although the Republic was a government
made up of radical Socialists, Communists, and Anarchists who professed their internationalism
and anti-colonialism, it was still largely Eurocentric in its views and hopes for revolution. This is
shown in the colonial manner in which Caballero later approached Moroccans. Largo Caballero
was a man described as the “Spanish Lenin'', yet he only saw the Moroccans and their
independence as a secondary matter in the Spanish Revolution. After the first meeting by the
Moroccan Action Committee, Caballero approached Moroccan nationalists again in the hopes of
sparking a revolt. However, he did this without promising any autonomy or independence.
Instead, he merely offered money and treated the Moroccans of the Rif as mercenaries that could
be bought and used for war.54 In other instances, Caballero reportedly tried to sell off part of
Spanish Morocco to win concessions from the French and English.55 Moroccans of the Rif were
largely anti-Franco but the Republic was too tied up into European interests that they could not
see that their real allies were not the French or English but the people of Morocco who wanted to
free themselves from the same Fascism they fought in Spain.
Conclusion
In a 1938 article in New Leader, George Padamore, a famous Pan-Africanist Socialist
theorist, discussed the use of Moroccan troops in the Spanish Civil War. He highlighted the
failure of the Republican government and their policy of continuing Imperialism, noting that
most Moroccans did not particularly agree with Fascism but did so out of economic necessity.56
He argued that if the Republic had done more to help the Moroccans, the Moroccans would not
be fighting for Franco. Padamore also made another argument using the Spanish Civil War as a
lesson to French and British workers. He begins by highlighting the fact that in order to obtain
the colony in Morocco, The Spanish government first suppressed its own people by installing a
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dictatorship and suppressing democracy.57 In order to suppress the tribes of the Rif, the Spanish
workers first had to be suppressed and that this was the price the Spanish people had to “pay for
empire.” Essentially, the Spanish Civil War was the reverse; in order to suppress the people of
Spain, Franco and the Nationalists had to suppress the people of Morocco. Instead of uniting
against the same foe, which was Colonialism, the Spanish instead stuck to Europe. As a result,
not only were they suppressed, but Moroccans would not have independence for another two
decades. He ends his argument by telling workers to beware and that the lesson from the Spanish
Civil War is to show “more solidarity in deeds not in words.”
The lesson is still something that needs to be learned: that movements and causes will
only prevail through solidarity with the oppressed and colonized. The Spanish Republic for all its
revolutionary potential and liberatory social change, was still tied in colonialism and racism.
While the Anarchists of the CNT-FAI and most of the Socialists of Catalonia supported the
prospects of decolonization, the system set up across the Republic was still built on the colonial
system. The fall of the Republic and its failure in the Civil War are hinged on a multitude of
reasons and histories. Yet amongst all the discourse of military tactics, politics, and social
change, there is very little talk about the fact that even as a Republic, Spain was still a colonial
empire. Even less is mentioned about that fact that after most of the government was made up of
Radical Socialists, it was still a colonial empire. The lesson is that even though so many sought a
radical break from the past, they still could not break with the benefits of superiority and
Eurocentrism that was so antithetical to their beliefs. Thus, the real importance of Morocco in the
war was not its weapons, but the fact that it questions what could have happened had the
Republic truly been for freedom, had it decolonized and broken with the Colonial powers.
Perhaps a revolt in Morocco would have completely disrupted the Fascists enough to allow for a
Republican victory. It may have created an independent or autonomous Morocco that could have
sparked further decolonization in the French Colonies. However, none of these potentialities
happened because Spain “paid the price for the empire”. This is a lesson that teaches to this day
that it is always vital for a movement to be intersectional and decolonial if it is to truly liberate
all people.
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